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INTRODUCTION

The much-maligned canons of statutory construction stubbornly
have survived, largely on the strength of the assertion that whatever the
aim of the statute's interpretation, an interpretive canon will improve
the chances that the statute's aim will be realized. Canonical construction serves two different functions. Some of the canons ostensibly are
designed as short-cuts to the discovery of the legislature's "true" intent.
Professor Geoffrey Miller has explained how the canons may reflect the
judicial articulations of conversational conventions that help courts un*

Acting Professor of Law, University of California-Berkeley. Earlier versions of this paper

were presented at the Vanderbilt Law Review Symposium on the Canons of Statutory Construction and at a University of Southern California Legal Theory Workshop. I am grateful to the
participants at both events and especially to Professor Robert Rasmussen for his useful comments.
David DeGroot and Eric Steinert provided excellent research assistance.
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derstand otherwise vexing statutory language.' Canons may also serve
as surrogates for other, better evidence of legislators' intent. In this regard, canonical construction is a second-best strategy. It is a concession
to the intractability of traditional legislative history and the problems
inherent in other approaches of discerning both legislative intent and
the purposes of the statute.2
Other canons represent interpretive rules based upon substantive
policy.' This sort of canonical construction enables courts to articulate,
in the context of their responsibility to interpret the words and history
of the statute, critical public values and to implement legislative policy
in the light of these values.4 Statutory interpretation is a more incremental, and less rigid, form of judicial decisionmaking than constitutional interpretation. Hence, canonical construction implements
important values with less disruption to the political and legislative
processes. 5
This more substantive form of canonical construction raises a distinct set of concerns. The most central concern is that judicial policymaking through the guise of statutory interpretation is illegitimate.
Why should judges be able to substitute their own policy preferences
through the creation and application of public values canons for the
preferences of Congress as articulated in the words and history of .the
statute? Canonical construction is an indirect means of doing what
courts should be doing, if at all, directly. The role of the courts, in this
account, is limited to finding and applying the will of Congress. 6 To do
otherwise is to disrupt the constitutional separation of powers between
Congress and the courts.
While these questions are critical, I am not terribly concerned, in
this Article at least, with exploring the important constitutional and
theoretical arguments for and against the use of interpretive canons.
Most of the issues raised in the literature on the legitimacy of canonical
1. See, for example, Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmaticsand the Maxims of Interpretation,1990
Wis. L. Rev. 1179. For descriptions of some of the various maxims of word meaning reflected in
certain interpretive canons, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip P. Frickey, Legislation:Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 639-46 (West, 1987).
2. See Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev.
405, 451-60 (1989); Ronald R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 316-31 (Harvard, 1985).
3. See Eskridge and Frickey, Legislation at 655 (cited in note 1).
4. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1007 (1989). See also Sunstein, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405 (cited in note 2).
5. Constitutional interpretation is disruptive to the extent that it is considerably more difficult for such an interpretation to be overturned. By contrast, statutory interpretations can be overridden by mere legislative and presidential action. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 Yale L. J. 331 (1991).
6. See Lawrence C. Marshall, The Canons of Statutory Construction as Judicial Constraints, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 673 (1992).
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construction are subject to the same sort of analyses that characterize
the normative literature on statutory interpretation in general.7 The
propriety of canonical construction turns on how we resolve questions
of legislative supremacy, separation of powers, and the appropriate role
of judicial creativity. Here, I am interested in considering a different
sort of claim made on behalf of canonical construction. This interest is
prompted by a remark of Professor Cass Sunstein in his recent book
After the Rights Revolution.8 Professor Sunstein suggests that the use
of canons actually can improve legislative decisionmaking and
administration:
[Another] function of interpretive principles is to promote better lawmaking. Such
principles might, for example, minimize judicial and administrative discretion, or
push legislative processes in desirable directions. The effort is to improve lawmaking processes and the deliberation and accountability that are supposed to accompany them. In this respect, some interpretive principles fulfill goals associated with
the separation of powers and with plausible assessments of comparative institutional competence. They are designed above all to channel certain decisions
through certain institutions, or to improve the operation of those institutions. 9

Professor Sunstein ascribes to canonical construction a tremendously important role. In his account, the canons not only reflect and
implement critical public values, but they also improve politics and the
legislative process.
The prospect that a certain method of statutory interpretation improves the process of legislative decisionmaking deserves serious consideration. Where controversy rages over the use of various interpretive
approaches, 10 defending one method on grounds other than that "it is
commanded by the Constitution" may provide a pathway out of dilemmas and difficulties that otherwise are difficult to manage. While the
forty-plus years of scholarship on the canons after Professor Llewellyn's
famous attack" have reflected variations on the theme of supremacy
and constitutional authority, it is time to turn our attention toward the
largely unexplored questions at the intersection of positive political the7. Id.; Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction
and Judicial Preferences, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 647 (1992).
8. Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution (Harvard, 1990).
9. Id. at 154.
10. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1597 (1991); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 S. Ct. Rev. 231; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621 (1990); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of
Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme
Court, 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 277 (1990). For a useful reminder that controversies of statutory interpretation are not peculiar to the United States, see the contributions in D. Neil MacCormick and
Robert S. Summers, eds., InterpretingStatutes: A Comparative Study (Dartmouth, 1991).
11. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950).
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ory 12 and normative legal scholarship and to see whether canonical construction generates a set of institutional consequences and policy
outcomes that can justify the continued use of the method.
In my contribution to this Symposium, I want to work outward toward some of the institutional issues posed by canonical construction
by taking a close look at one canon, the presumption of reviewability of
administrative agency decisions. The Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) accords individuals a statutory right of judicial review. 13 However, Congress may preclude judicial review by statute.1 4 Since Abbott
5 decided in 1967, courts have explained that
Laboratories v. Gardner,1
where Congress has not expressly precluded judicial review of agency
action, the reviewing court should presume that Congress did not intend to preclude such review. This presumption may be overcome
only by "clear and convincing evidence" that Congress intended
17
otherwise.
The main consequence of this canon is to increase significantly the
likelihood that a court will find an administrative action reviewable.
Whether courts should take steps-of which the presumption of reviewability is one example-to facilitate judicial scrutiny of agency decisions
is, of course, a perennial debate in administrative law. Revisiting this
issue is not the principle purpose of this Article. I am interested, however, in the nexus between the presumption of reviewability as a canon
of statutory construction and the controversy over judicial review of
agency decisions framed by debates over whether and to what extent
Congress has precluded judicial review by statute.
12. See generally Symposium, Positive PoliticalTheory and Public Law, 80 Georgetown L.
J. 457 (1992).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
15. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
16. The type of judicial review to which the presumption of reviewability attaches is the
review of agency decisions described in Section 706 of the APA. This section provides that
The reviewing court shall...(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this
title.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
The question whether individuals have a constitutional right to review of agency decisions on
the basis of an alleged constitutional violation is an open question. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S.
592 (1988); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). Also unsettled is whether Congress may preclude judicial review of claims based on an alleged violation of the agency's organic statute. See
Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians,476 U.S. 667 (1986); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S.
184 (1958).
17. Abbott Laboratories,387 U.S. at 140.
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The presumption of reviewability reflects an effort by courts to
fashion a rule of construction that, in making it substantially more difficult for Congress to demonstrate its intent to preclude judicial review,
protects the perogatives of courts to create and shape a body of
law-administrative law-free from ultimate control by Congress. To
be sure, Congress is the final judge of when review is precluded; but the
presumption of reviewability ensures that legislators must expend
greater than normal costs to rebut this presumption and thus to exercise their final collective judgment. As with other costs borne by legislators attempting to reach agreement over statutory policies, these costs
may have the effect of changing the final bargain.
The interplay between courts and Congress is worthy of study by
those concerned with understanding contemporary debates over statutory interpretation. Professor Sunstein's assertion that canonical construction improves the legislative process is provocative and invites just
the sort of study reflected in some of the recent scholarship on statutory interpretation and political institutions. In this Article, I am interested in the basic positive question, why do we have canons like the
presumption of reviewability and, to a lesser degree, the normative
question, what role should these canons play in the process of statutory
interpretation?
In Part II of this Article, I describe the role of canons and canonical construction in statutory interpretation. My aim is to situate the
canons within a framework of interpretive rules generated by courts
and applied within a structure made up of distinct, yet interdependent
legal institutions. In Part III, I describe the presumption of reviewability, within the context of the framework of interpretive rules sketched
out in Part II and within the context of contemporary administrative
law. Part IV assesses the consequences of canonical construction of the
sort represented by the presumption of reviewability for the processes
of law-making and law-interpreting.

II.

THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF INTERPRETIVE RULES

The canons of statutory construction have long been featured in
analyses of, and arguments over, statutory interpretation methodology.18 Canons have been described as "the collective folk wisdom of
statutory interpretation;"' 19 they enable those interpreting the statute to
18. In addition to the contributions contained in this Symposium, see Sunstein, After the
Rights Revolution (cited in note 8); Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 279-81
(Harvard, 1990); Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 2 (Harvard, 1984);

Miller, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1179 (cited in note 1); Sunstein, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405 (cited in note 2).
19.

See Posner, Problems of Jurisprudence at 280 (cited in note 18).
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draw inferences from its language, format, and subject matter. 20 The
canons of construction are merely one form of an eclectic set of devices
used in the process of implementing the statute's meaning through
interpretation.2 1
The canons, like all other interpretive rules, 22 help organize the interpretive task. While the statute at issue will differ from case to case,
interpretive rules that transcend a particular law can help frame the
proper interpretive method for the court and, thereby, aid it in coming
up with a "better" construction in the specific case. This organizational
function is especially critical where the judge is faced with indeterminate statutory language and inconclusive legislative history.
One way to think about this organizational function is by considerhow
interpretive rules promote judicial efficiency.2 3 Insofar as the
ing
opportunity costs of deciding cases are positive, judges will take steps
to reduce the costs of deciding cases. Where these cases involve interpretations of statutes, the decisionmaking costs will include the effort
to reach a conclusion about the proper method of statutory interpretation. By anchoring statutory interpretation to a set of ready-made rules,
judges can more efficiently decide statutory cases. Efficiency-enhancing
devices such as canonical construction are increasingly valuable as Congress passes more statutes and therefore courts are faced with a growing
number of statutory interpretation cases. Moreover, the efficiency function of interpretive rules is especially important in an era in which controversy rages over how statutes should be interpreted.2 4
Certain interpretive rules also may aid the legislature. Judge Frank
Easterbrook explains that
some rules of statutory construction are useful for the same reason rules are useful
in interpreting contracts. They spare legislators the need to decide and announce,
law by law, the rules that will be used for interpreting the code of words they select. . . . Rules are desirable not because legislators in fact know or use them in
passing laws but because rules serve as off-the-rack provisions that spare legislators
of anticipating all possible interpretive problems and legislating solutions
the costs 25
for them.

Despite some of the advantages to legislators of creating certain ca20. Id.
21. Eskridge and Frickey, Legislation at 639 (cited in note 1).
22. Interpretive rules are ubiquitous and include, in addition to the canons, instructions
about how to approach ambiguous statutory language, about whose intent matters in considering
the intent of the legislature, and information regarding other structural, institutional, and political
questions that arise whenever statutes are interpreted.
23. The connection between legal rules and decision costs is a common theme in the law and
economics literature. See, for example, Ronald A. Heiner, Imperfect Decisions and the Law: On
the Evolution of Legal Precedent and Rules, 15 J. Legal Stud. 227 (1986).
24. See sources cited in note 10.
25. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 540 (1983).
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nons and other interpretive rules, most rules originate in judicial decisions, not in statutes. To be sure, many of the canons are defended on
the grounds that they implement what Congress really wanted, but expressed inartfully or incompletely. These types of canons have been described in various ways, as "intrinsic aids,"2 6 "linguistic canons, 2 7 and
"descriptive canons."2 8 There is little doubt that several of the canons
fulfill this function. This is especially true of the canons that reflect
"conversational conventions," and conventions of grammar and syntax.
These are conventions that courts could reasonably predict that legislators had or should have had in mind when they enacted a statute.2 9
Also, the ubiquitous "absurd results" canon, reflecting the principle
that statutes should not be interpreted in a way that ensures an absurd
result, no doubt facilitates legislators' shared views that such clear mistakes must be avoided.30 Most of the canons, however, find little warrant either in the legislative record or in positive analyses of how and
why legislators pass statutes. In addition, there is a rich collection of
canons that have little to do with predictions about legislative intent or
grammar. These so-called "substantive" or "normative" canons represent the courts' decisions to implement an important "public value"
through the mechanism of statutory interpretation, subject, as always,
to Congress's decision to displace this value with a clear statement to
the contrary. These normative canons may or may not coincide with
legislators' values or intentions. In any case, it does not matter, since
the canons are grounded in values and principles extrinsic to the purposes of a particular statute or the preferences of legislators at various
points in time.
Congress seldom legislates interpretive rules for courts to use."'
Moreover, it is not clear that courts would abide by interpretive rules
that Congress lays down. The heated debate over the so-called "plain
meaning" approach to statutory interpretation, also called the "new
textualism, ' 3 2 is an illustration. Textualism is defended by judges on a
26. Eskridge and Frickey, Legislation at 639 (cited in note 1).
27. William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992) (describing Professor Llewellyn's taxonomy).
28. Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its
Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 561 (1992).
29. See Miller, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1179 (cited in note 1).
30. See, for example, Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989); Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989); Holy Trinity Church v. United States,
143 U.S. 457 (1892).
31. This is not to say that Congress refrains from influencing the process of statutory interpretation. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation and Political Advantage (manuscript on file, UC Berkeley, 1991).
32. Eskridge, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621 (cited in note 10); Zeppos, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1597 (cited
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variety of bases, ranging from constitutional separation of powers to
pragmatic judgments about the role of judges and the proper function
of statutory interpretation.3 3 Congress, however, rarely commands
courts to follow a textualist approach to interpretation. Indeed, legislators have reacted to the recent renaissance of textualism as an interpretive strategy with substantial hostility.3 4 Textualist judges are digging
in, however, claiming that their approach to statutory interpretation is
appropriate and legitimate. 5 And despite the hue and cry among textualism's opponents, there seems to be little doubt that courts have the
right to craft their own rules of statutory interpretation regardless of
congressional action. Courts historically have reserved for themselves
the power to fashion these interpretive rules. And while Congress has
occasionally unraveled statutory interpretations that it finds unacceptable,3 6 it has done so episodically, without a serious attempt to constrict
the judiciary's power to establish the ground rules for statutory interpretation. The persistence of the canons of construction shows that the
courts' efforts to maintain the power to decide how to decide have withstood change in both legislative politics and theoretical approaches to
statutory interpretation.
The principal value of the canons rests on the effects that they
have on legislative decisions. The various clear statement rules that
form the bulk of the more substantively oriented canons of construction
are the best examples of this. A clear statement rule raises the costs
that the legislature must bear in enacting its statutory purposes into
law. For example, the canon that Congress must speak clearly if it
wishes to displace the sovereignty of Indian tribes increases the costs to
the legislative coalition that would displace this sovereignty, making
this displacement less likely.38 These costs include the pressures placed
on marginal legislators, that is, those legislators whose support is critical to ensuring that the bill passes. Requiring that the legislation be
in note 10).

33. For an eclectic series of defenses of textualist interpretation, see Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct.
2258, 2267 (1990) (Scalia dissenting); Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 473
(1989) (Kennedy concurring); Easterbrook, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (cited in note 25). Schauer, 1990
S. Ct. Rev. 231 (cited in note 10).
34. See, for example, Joan Biskupic, Congress Keeps Eye on Justices As Court Watches
Hill's Words, Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2863 (October 5, 1991); Joan Biskupic, Scalia Takes a Narrow
View in Seeking Congress's Will, Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 913, 918 (March 24, 1990).
35. See sources cited in note 33.
36. For a comprehensive description and analysis of recent instances of legislative overruling,
see Eskridge, 101 Yale L. J. 331 (cited in note 5).
37. See part III.
38. See, for example, South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. 498, 506 (1986);
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States,
391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968).
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clear in order to convince a court that Congress means to displace tribal
sovereignty, states' rights or any other important value represented by
the canon, may push marginal legislators away from supporting a bill.
They may be hesitant to support publicly an explicit statement of this
policy. After all, some legislators would prefer to leave the statutory
language ambiguous. They would be inclined to shift the blame to the
courts if courts interpret the statute wrongly. Legislators may prefer to
leave the law unclear in order to provide flexibility to maneuver in the
face of future interest groups and shifting coalitions in Congress and in
the executive branch. Finally, legislators may prefer to assign authority
to an administrative agency to shape the statute in accordance with the
law's general principles. In this light, the canon has the effect of making
legislators legislate where they would prefer to delegate responsibility to
institutions such as agencies. Notwithstanding these reasons for speaking ambiguously, courts may use canons to force Congress to resolve
certain issues in the statute. The price of not resolving these issues is an
interpretation which may or may not give credence to the will of the
legislative majority that enacted the statute. Canonical construction at
least encourages the legislature to make its intent more plain and, at
most, disables a statutory compromise over certain legislative language,
thereby preventing legislators from enacting into law a policy outcome
that would threaten important values without bearing substantial polit39
ical costs.
To illustrate the dynamics of court-Congress interaction in the context of canonical construction, I will describe one interpretive canon in
detail, the presumption of reviewability of administrative agency
decisions.

III.

THE ANATOMY OF A CANON: THE PRESUMPTION OF REVIEWABILITY

A.

Reviewability and the Politics of Judicial Review

There is a deep sense in which the presumption that courts must
be empowered to review agency decisions is a truism. "The availability
of judicial review," says Professor Jaffe, "is the necessary condition,
psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power
which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid."4 0 Thus, administrative law has come to mean judicial review of agency action, no more
and no less. The very notion of a system of administrative law designed
to check agency malfeasance and ensure fidelity to both Congress's
wishes and constitutional principles entails a role for an external arbiter
39.
40.

See part III.B.
Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 320 (Little, Brown, 1965).
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to control agencies through judicial review power.4 1 Indeed, the notion
that judicial review is a necessary condition of legitimate administrative
power is so deeply ingrained that it takes some effort to think somewhat more dispassionately about the concept and consequences of more
rather than less aggressive review.
Judicial review was not always treated as a necessary, or even salutary, element of the modern administrative state. Aggressive judicial review in the early years of the administrative state nearly destroyed the
first great regulatory experiments. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), for example, performed its regulatory functions in the
shadow of a continuing controversy over the proper role of courts in
reviewing ICC decisions. 42 For the first thirty years of the ICC, the
agency functioned as an elaborate adjunct to the federal courts with the
courts taking the responsibility for setting regulatory policy. 43 The
courts frustrated both the purposes of the Interstate Commerce Act
and the general purposes underlying Progressive Era regulation, in particular, the vision of the expert agency equipped with the44power and
resources to craft effective and apolitical regulatory policy.
1. Perspectives on Judicial Review
As Congress vested federal administrative agencies with increased
regulatory responsibilities, courts began to develop a "common law of
judicial review" designed to check agency malfeasance.4 5 This common
law expressed the courts' concern that Congress had not adequately
cabined administrative discretion. Even if courts were given the authority to review agency decisions for compliance with the organic statute,
this would not be enough to circumscribe adequately agency discretion.
The premise of administrative law was that courts should construct independent limits on agency action since they could not expect either
the agency itself, the President, or Congress to exercise control. Moreover, any control that was exercised by nonjudicial institutions would
be statute-specific. There would be no principles that would structure
the process of administration. By contrast, courts could delineate gen41. See Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law chs. 8 & 9 (Little, Brown, 3d ed. 1991); Cass
R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421 (1987).
42. See, for example, Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion
of NationalAdministrative Capacities,1877-1920 (Cambridge, 1982); Robert Rabin, FederalRegulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189 (1986).
43. See Skowronek, Building a New American State at 150-62 (cited in note 42).
44. A similar tale of judicial frustration of legislative purpose and agency policymaking is
told in connection with labor law and the New Deal. See Rabin, 38 Stan. L. Rev. at 1253-59 (cited
in note 42). The experience of the ICC between 1887 and 1920 is one example of a phenomenon
characteristic of the court-agency partnership in the early years of the administrative state.
45. Kenneth C. Davis, 4 Administrative Law Treatise § 28.07 (West, 1958).
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eral principles through a common-law process that was meant to lay
down rules and standards appropriate to all agencies and all types of
agency decisions.
From Congress's standpoint, this common law of judicial review
was troublesome. The notion that courts could overlay statutory law
with a blanket of general decisionmaking principles was threatening to
a Congress concerned with engineering a machinery of regulation and
administration free of unnecessary interference. Moreover, New Dealers
continued to fear obstructionist courts filled with Republicans who as of
yet had not gotten with the program. Faced with a hostile federal
branch, New Dealers took steps to limit the role of judicial review by
enacting statutes that provided for greater agency discretion. The ICC
mess, for example, drove Congress to amend the Interstate Commerce
Act with the Transportation Act of 1920. This act provided the ICC
with stronger and more complete regulatory authority and, by implication, mandated a weaker role for the courts.4 6 Similarly, Congress
cabined the courts' role in labor disputes under both the Railway Labor
Act and the National Labor Relations Act.47 In both instances, Congress sent a message that administrative policy was to be developed in
the agencies and not in the courts. But how far was Congress willing to
go? With these broad delegation statutes did Congress intend to displace administrative law, leaving courts with "mere" statutory and constitutional instruments of control?
And, at a deeper level, there was a critical question of power. Could
Congress preempt administrative law by cordoning off certain agency
decisions from judicial control? On the one hand, the notion that courts
can, through a sort of federal common law, apply their own standards
for proper agency decisionmaking seems to imply that they are the
judges of when review is appropriate. On the other hand, if Congress
can short-circuit this process by replacing the common law of judicial
review with a comprehensive statute, then surely Congress can take the
smaller step of precluding judicial review in certain instances.
Out of these real political concerns came the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946. In one sense, Congress gave its imprimatur on
the enterprise of court-driven administrative law by enacting the scope
of judicial review provisions currently set out in Section 706.8 The APA
empowered courts to find decisions unlawful not only on the grounds
that the agency had transversed the commands of the substantive stat46. Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456. (1920) See Skowronek, Building a New American State at 279-83 (cited in note 42) (describing the history and significance of the Act).
47. Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934); National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449
(1935).
48. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
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ute or the Constitution, but also because the decisions were "arbitrary,
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion ' 49 or "unsupported by substantial
evidence."" ° Section 706, thus, created statutory authorization for a
continuing common law of judicial review.
This authorization was not without limits, however. Although Section 706's instruction to courts to review agency decisions according to
these standards is open-ended, the politics of regulation and administration in the APA's early years suggests that the scope of review provisions were designed to rein in judges who had been substituting their
substantive judgments for those of the administrative agencies assigned
to implement regulatory policy. At bottom, Section 706 reflects an accommodation to the demands for judicial review while, at the same
time, an admonition to courts to retreat from the super-strong review
that had threatened to dismantle the New Deal.
2. Preclusion, Discretion, and the APA
The relationship between reviewability and the politics of judicial
review is aptly illustrated in the most important pre-APA decision on
reviewability authored by the quintessential New Dealer, Justice William 0. Douglas. Switchmen's Union v. NationalMediationBoard51 involved a challenge to a National Mediation Board decision concerning a
representation election dispute. The Railway Labor Act of 1934, which
created the National Mediation Board and authorized it to decide collective bargaining disputes, neither expressly authorized nor expressly
precluded ieview.52 Writing for a majority of four, 53 Justice Douglas explained how Congress had carefully crafted the Board as a means of
handling controversial matters. According to Justice Douglas, it was
very important "to provide a neutral tribunal which can make the decision and get the matter settled.

' 54

Judicial review would disrupt the

administrative arrangement structured by Congress. It was, therefore,
not at all surprising that Congress did not expressly authorize judicial
review for "if Congress had desired to implicate the federal judiciary
and to place on the federal courts the burden of having the final say on
49.
50.

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). This standard is applicable in "a case subject to sections 556 and

557 [of the APA] or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute."
Id.
51. 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
52. Railway Labor Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1185 § 2 (1934).
53. Justices Black and Rutledge did not participate in the decision.
54. 320 U.S. at 303 (quoting Railway Labor Act of 1934, Hearings on H.R. 7650 before the
House Committee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934) (statement of
Commissioner Eastman, draftsman of § 2, Ninth)).
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any aspect of the problem, it would have made its desire plain." 55
Switchmen's Union was very much a product of its times, that is, a
part of a genre of post-New Deal, pre-APA administrative law decisions
in which the New Deal's defenders on the Court fashioned rules that
would ensure the survival and vitality of this grand regulatory experiment. Since the battle was essentially between a Democratic majority in
Congress and President Roosevelt on one side and conservative judges
appointed by Roosevelt's predecessors on the other, the Court's New
Dealers characteristically would take positions that restricted the role
of the courts." Entrusting the reviewability determination to Congress
was a fit solution for those who chafed at the courts' campaign of opposition to the New Deal. It is in this light,, however, that the APA's solution to the question of reviewability seems on the surface peculiar.
After all, if the New Dealers were so afraid of judicial review, what explains Congress's decision to establish a statutory right of review, a
right that can be trumped only when Congress acts affirmatively to preclude review? On closer inspection, however, the APA's creation of a
statutory right to review is not the significant step that it appears to be
on the surface. To begin with, pre-APA administrative law usually accorded a right to judicial review unless Congress had precluded review
by statute.5 7 Framed as a sort of presumption, the notion was that review was necessary to assuage concerns over the constitutionality of the
New Deal regulatory statutes. Review was part of a constitutional quid
pro quo: courts would decline to employ the nondelegation doctrine to
overturn statutes and, in return, courts would preserve the power to
review agency decisions." In any case, the presumption in favor of review (not to be confused with the presumption of reviewability) in the
absence of Congressional preclusion was essentially settled law even
before the APA provided a right of review in Section 702. 9
In any event, New Dealers could be quite satisfied with the reviewability structure they wrought in Section 701. The APA provides two
separate bases of preclusion. Taken together, they reflect Congress's
judgment that whether and to what extent review is precluded is up to
Congress to decide. Considered separately, the two parts of Section 701
reflect two different approaches to divining congressional intent with
55. Id. at 303.
56. As Professor Jaffe put it:
"Haunted by a past of judicial arrogance, beguiled by the promise of administrative action, a majority of the judges who participated were easily persuaded of the
irrelevance of the judicial role." Jaffe, JudicialControl at 344 (cited in note 40).
57. See generally id. at 339-43; Note, Statutory Preclusion of Judicial Review Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 1976 Duke L. J. 431, 433-34.
58. See, for example, Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). See generally Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 915 (1988).
59. See Jaffe, Judicial Control at 339-43 (cited in note 40).
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regard to review. Section 701(a)(1), the section to which the presumption of reviewability attaches, provides that the statute may preclude
review. And Section 701(a)(2) provides that review is precluded to the
extent that "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 60
"By law" in this section has no clear referent. If "by law" means
the substantive statute, then Section 701(a)(2) is redundant. If the statute precludes judicial review then the decision is committed to the
agency's discretion and vice versa. If, however, it means an external
source of law, such as administrative common law, then it threatens to
subject the question of reviewability, and perhaps judicial review altogether, to unchecked judicial discretion.
Another puzzling feature of Section 701(a)(2) is that it appears to
be in conflict with Section 706(2)(A). Although Section 701(a)(2) indicates that there are agency decisions that are discretionary and, thus,
immune from judicial review, Section 706(2)(A) authorizes courts to review agency decisions found to be an abuse of discretion."' In Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,62 the Supreme Court struggled
to cure the first paradox by treating Section 701(a)(2) as "a very narrow
exception, ' 63 applicable only where "statutes are drawn in such broad
terms that in a given case there is no law to apply."6 4 Even a statutory
standard as amorphous as that at issue in Overton Park-an instruction that the Secretary of Transportation consider whether there is a
"'feasible and prudent' alternative" to the use of parkland for the creation of an interstate highway-is sufficient to direct the court.6 5 At the
very least, therefore, a statute that contains a rather broad delegation
of power to an agency does not vest the agency with unreviewable discretion. On the other hand, Overton Park does confirm that there are
situations in which judicial review may be precluded regardless of
whether Congress precludes review, expressly or even implicitly, in the
substantive statute. Where there is no law to apply, the court may not
consider a claim that the agency has abused its discretion. If there is no
law to apply, the agency has untrammeled discretion and, notwithstanding Section 706(2)(A), cannot abuse its discretion. 6
60. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1988). For a lively early debate over the scope of this section, see
Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (1965);
Kenneth C. Davis, 4 Administrative Law Treatise § 28.16 (Supp. 1965); Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 783 (1966); Kenneth C.
Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Final Word, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 814 (1966).
61. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
62. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
63. Id. at 410.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 405.
66. The determination that there is no law to apply is tantamount to a decision on the mer-
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If we can focus on these two provisions without the gloss put upon
each of them by important judicial decisions, including those decisions
which fashion the presumption of reviewability, we can see a symmetry
between Sections 701(a)(1) and (a)(2) that may well explain the political arrangement structured by the APA's framers. It is an arrangement
that, in turn, perhaps explains what the coalition that succeeded in getting the APA passed was trying to accomplish with Section 701.
In enacting Section 701(a)(1), Congress may well have limited the
instances in which judicial review is precluded to those covered by express statutory language. The danger that such a reading would, by enshrining this clear statement principle, impose too strict a burden on
Congress's ability to preclude review is averted by Section 701(a)(2),
which section provides that Congress may, with or without a clear statement, commit a decision to the agency's discretion. This commitment
must be "by law." Yet, this does not necessarily suggest that Congress
must speak plainly to commit the decision to the agency's discretion.
Indeed, were such a requirement applicable in this second part of Section 701, it would be redundant. The two parts of Section 701 are explicable if read to require Congress, if it desires to preclude judicial
review, to do so expressly or to provide reasons sufficient to persuade a
court that review is implicitly precluded, that is, committed to agency
discretion by law.
Whatever the proper reading of the two parts of Section 701, the
APA is clear that the reviewability determination is for Congress. To be
sure, the right of review is ensured by the APA and is, therefore, not
dependent on the beneficence of a future Congress. 6 7 But both bases for
preclusion rely, if read in the most sensible political context, on congressional choice.6
its, that is, a determination that the agency has acted in accordance with the law. Needless to say,
this result sounds peculiar. The claim is that the agency has acted lawfully because, after all, there
is no law to apply. Perhaps in an effort to avoid this asymmetry, the decision is cast as one involving the threshold question of reviewability. See Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653, 659 (1985). Cf. William A. Fletcher, The Structure
of Standing, 98 Yale L. J. 221 (1988) (arguing that the question of standing be resolved as part of
the merits of the case).
67. The most provocative recent attempt to tell a comprehensive political story about the
APA and its Congress is contained in the work of "McNollgast." See Matthew D. McCubbins,
Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, Positive and Normative Models of ProceduralRights: An
Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures, 6 J. L., Econ. & Org. 307 (1990); Matthew D.
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431 (1989);
Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L., Econ. & Org. 243 (1987).
68. We may well ask why Congress would put so much faith in future Congressional bodies.
Is it because New Dealers trusted that they would remain firmly in power? Perhaps that is the
reason. Another explanation is that the Congress assumed that most of the statutes that would be
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Politics Redux: Fashioning the Presumption of Reviewability

Some twenty years or so after the APA was passed, liberals and
conservatives changed teams."" Where the spectre of judicial review had
seemed so threatening to New Dealers, liberals in the public interest
era70 understood that federal administrative agencies and a Republican
President presented their own set of dangers.7 ' Moreover, the Supreme
Court now was the Warren Court, or more importantly from the standpoint of administrative law, the D.C. Court of Appeals was the Wright72
Bazelon court.
An early example of how this shift played out in reviewability controversies is the Supreme Court's decision in Leedom v. Kyne.7 ' In Leedom, the Court considered whether the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) precluded review of a claim alleging unlawful action by the
National Labor Relations Board. While the NLRA in fact authorized
review of Board decisions in certain circumstances, review was not triggered in this case. The Court found that review was nonetheless appropriate, announcing "[t]his suit is not one to 'review,' in the sense of that
term as used in the Act, a decision of the Board made within its jurisdiction. Rather, it is one to strike down an order of the Board made in
excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in
the Act."'7 4 Perhaps. However, the plaintiff in Switchmen's Union had
made a similar claim fifteen years earlier. And the Court found nothing
in the NLRA that expressed an intent on the part of Congress to allow
review of these types of decisions without the restrictions imposed on
other forms of review. While the Court in Switchmen's Union worried
about meddlesome judges disturbing the elegant bureaucratic structure
fashioned by Congress, the Leedom Court saw it differently: "Where, as
at issue in the future would already have been enacted. With hindsight, consider whether a legislator of the time could have predicted the dramatic new social regulation movement of the 1960s.
Most legislators probably thought that the regulatory state would chug along in about the same
fashion as it had up until 1946. The New Dealers may well have been less confident that they
would remain in power but more confident that there would not be such significant statutory action to raise the question of reviewability that would be answered by legislation enacted by a very
different group of folks.
69. See Martin Shapiro, The APA: Past, Present, and Future, 72 Va. L. Rev. 447 (1986).
70. This term comes from Rabin, 38 Stan. L. Rev. at 1278 (cited in note 42).
71. Presidential influence on administrative decisionmaking and its inherent dangers is a
dominant theme in contemporary administrative law scholarship. See, for example, Cynthia R.
Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 452 (1989); Thomas 0. McGarity, PresidentialControl of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 443 (1987).
72. See, for example, Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Automotive Parts & Accessories v. Boyd, 407
F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
73. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
74. Id. at 188.
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here, Congress has given a 'right' to the professional employees it must
be held that it intended that right to be enforced, and 'the courts...
encounter no difficulty in fulfilling its purpose.' ,,75
Questions of reviewability became considerably more difficult in recent decades not only because the politics of the courts and of Congress
changed, but also because of the changing character of regulation and
public administration. First, modern regulatory statutes addressed
polycentric problems. A growing number of interests and interest
groups were taken into account by Congress in enacting the omnibus
regulatory statutes of the 1960s and 1970s. The procedural architecture
of these statutes reflected the types of regulatory problems confronted
by modern administrative government. As the complexity of these statutes grew, so did the number of judicial decisions concerning administrative remedies and procedures, including reviewability. This statutory
complexity suggests a second reason for renewed controversies over reviewability. Modern regulatory statutes often required the agency to
reach a number of different decisions. Since the APA countenanced
partial preclusion, courts had to consider not only whether judicial review existed, but what decisions could or could not be reviewed.7 6 Difficult questions of preclusion arose, therefore, in connection with statutes
that provided for different categories of agency decisions or different
subjects covered by the same agency in the same statute. For example,
the statute may well have precluded judicial review of certain factual
determinations while retaining review of conclusions of law, or Congress
may have authorized judicial review of claims brought by certain individuals covered under the statute and not others. Therefore, the preclusion determinations are often complicated.
The presumption of reviewability was born at the beginning of this
era. In Abbott Laboratoriesv. Gardner,7 7 the Supreme Court was asked
to decide whether Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations,
enacted under a 1962 amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, were subject to preenforcement judicial challenge. Congress
had not provided for review explicitly. Moreover, the FDA argued that,
since Congress had provided a procedure for review of certain regulations under other provisions of the Act, the absence of such a review
procedure for these types of regulations implied that Congress intended
to preclude review. 7 8 It was in connection with this argument that Jus75. Id. at 191 (quoting Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 569
(1930)).
76. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1988).
77. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
78. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 371(e) and (f) (1988). In making this argument, the FDA relied on a
venerable interpretive canon of its own, namely, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The Su-

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:743

tice Harlan explained that "judicial review of a final agency action by
an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason
to believe that such was the purpose of Congress. '79 More precisely, it
is "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary
legislative intent [that the courts should] restrict access to judicial review." 8° Abbott Laboratories,like Switchmen's Union, was a product of
its times. By finding that agency action was reviewable, the Court complemented judicial efforts in this era to increase the various procedural
and substantive obligations of administrative agencies."1 The presumption of reviewability stood alongside decisions expanding standing, 2
scrutinizing the rationality of agency decisions, 83 and crafting additional
burdens agencies must meet to withstand judicial scrutiny. Since reviewability was a condition precedent to the courts' increasing scrutiny
of agency decisions, the presumption of reviewability was the linch-pin
of the courts' expanding power.
Since the Court in Abbott Laboratories framed the reviewability
decision in the language of burdens of proof and the weighing of evidence, one could surmise that courts were expected to determine
whether the evidence met the clear and convincing standard. The actual decisions in which the presumption of reviewability was invoked,
however, did not conform to this expectation. The cases decided after
Abbott Laboratories, and through the heyday of "hard look" judicial
review, 84 found more often than not that the statute at issue did not
preclude judicial review. But even in those pro-review decisions, it was
unclear how much the reviewability canon restructured the court's approach to discerning whether and to what extent Congress intended to
preclude review. Later, courts invoked the presumption of reviewability
as a sort of judicial mantra, proceeding to declare that Congress had
evinced no intent (much less a "clear and convincing" intent) to prepreme Court rejected this canonical argument with the help of a passage from Professor Jaffe's
classic treatise on judicial review of agency action. Says Jaffe: "The mere fact that some acts are
made reviewable should not suffice to support an implication of exclusion as to others. The right to
review is too important to be excluded on such slender and indeterminate evidence of legislative
intent." Jaffe, Judicial Control at 357 (cited in note 40) (quoted in 387 U.S. at 141).
79. 387 U.S. at 140.
80. Id. at 141 (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962)).
81. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
Harv. L. Rev. 1669 (1975).
82. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973);
Association of Data ProcessingService Organizationsv. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
83. See cases cited in note 72.
84. See generally Walter Gellhorn, et al., Administrative Law: Cases and Materials 475-503
(Foundation Press, 8th ed. 1987); Shapiro, 72 Va. L. Rev. at 462 (cited in note 69).
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clude review. 5 Where courts found that Congress had in fact intended
to preclude review, the basis was not an accounting of the substantial
evidence pointing in the direction of preclusion, but, instead, an examination into the structure and purposes of the statute. In a sense the
Court had circled back to the approach of Switchmen's Union. The
question was whether judicial review would further or frustrate the purposes of the statute in question. 6
In Morris v. Gressette,8 7 decided a decade after Abbott Laboratories, the Court considered whether the Attorney General's failure to
take particular action on voting arrangements brought to the Justice
Department's attention under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was
subject to federal court review.8 Section 5 instructed all jurisdictions
covered by the Act to submit new voting plans or changes to existing
plans to the Department of Justice. The Justice Department would review the proposals in order to make sure that the changes would have
neither the purpose nor the effect "of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color."8 9 These preclearance procedures had
become, by the mid-1970s, "the centerpiece of the statute." 90 Through
aggressive preclearance, the Justice Department could ensure compliance with the Voting Rights Act without relying on cumbersome, piecemeal litigation. Section 5 placed on the covered jurisdictions the burden
of proving in federal court that their electoral proposals did not deny or
abridge the right to vote.' Failing this burden, the change could not be
made. But what happens, the Court was asked in Gressette, if the Attorney General declined to object to a voting change within the prescribed time period? Can anyone challenge in federal court that refusal
to object?
According to the Gressette Court, the reviewability inquiry is
driven not by the sort of "weight of the evidence" analysis described in
Abbott Laboratories. Instead, the question is whether review makes
sense within "the context of the entire legislative scheme." 92 As far as
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is concerned, it was critical that
85. See generally Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988); Kries v. Secretary of the Air Force,
866 F.2d 1508, 1513 (D.C. Cir 1989); Kramer v. Mosbacher, 878 F.2d 134, 137 (4th Cir. 1989); Solar
Turbines, Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1076 (3d Cir. 1989); cf. NaturalResources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (overriding the presumption of judicial review).
86. See text accompanying notes 50-54.
87. 432 U.S. 491 (1977).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). On Section 5, see Abigail M. Thernstrom, Whose Vote Counts?
Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights, ch. 8, 157-91 (Harvard, 1987).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
90. See Thernstrom, Whose Vote Counts? ch. 3, at 43 (cited in note 88).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
92. 432 U.S. at 501 (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)).
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Congress provide an expedited remedy for jurisdictions whose changed
voting arrangements were subject to scrutiny by the Justice Department. Congress struck a reasonable bargain by providing for
preclearance review as a matter of course while providing covered jurisdictions with two relatively quick methods of compliance. To provide
for judicial review at the behest of individuals objecting to the Attorney
General's failure to object to a submitted plan would defeat this "expe93
ditious alternative.
Shades of Switchmen's Union. In, any event, there is no sign in the
Gressette Court's consideration of the Voting Rights Act of the sort of
clear and convincing evidence deemed necessary by the Court a decade
earlier. If the Court in Gressette was convinced of anything, it was that
allowing judicial review of the Attorney General's preclearance decisions would frustrate the purposes of Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act.
The Supreme Court made it rather clear that this evidentiary burden of proof attached to the presumption of reviewability was more
hortatory than real. In Block v. Community Nutrition Institute," the
Court considered whether the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of
1937 precluded judicial review of claims brought by milk consumers
challenging certain marketing orders issued by the Secretary of Agriculture. The Act in fact authorized judicial review of marketing orders
with regard to claims brought by two classes of potential complainants:
milk producers and milk handlers.9 5 Would-be plaintiffs, in order to
seek review, had to exhaust their administrative remedies as spelled out
in the statute.9 6 While the Act was silent as to whether consumers could
seek review, a group of consumers represented by the Community Nutrition Institute argued that they were entitled, along with the producers and handlers, to seek redress in court. Moreover, the absence of any
particular exhaustion requirements in the Act indicated that consumers
could go directly to federal court.
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, like so many other
statutes that the Court had considered in connection with reviewability,
was silent on the question of review of consumer claims. It was not silent, however, on review generally. Perhaps the failure to provide a system of review for consumers in light of the producer-handler review
provisions suggested that Congress had considered whether to grant review to consumers and had declined to do so. Or perhaps the purpose of
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 504.
467 U.S. 340 (1984).
See 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15).
Id.
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describing the reviewability arrangement for producers and handlers in
the statute was to make clear the administrative exhaustion requirements for these putative plaintiffs. By omitting descriptions of lawsuits
by consumers, perhaps Congress was content to leave the general rule of
reviewability, per the APA, intact for this category of plaintiffs. In
other words, perhaps Congress intended to give consumers more generous judicial remedies-or at least more generous access to the
courts-than either producers or handlers.
As to whether either of these speculations provides the sort of clear
and convincing evidence necessary to rebut the presumption of reviewability, the Court in Block emphasized that it had "never applied the
'clear and convincing evidence' standard in the strict evidentiary sense.
• . .Rather, the Court has found the standard met, and thus the presumption favoring judicial review overcome, whenever the congressional
intent to preclude judicial review is 'fairly discernible in the statutory
scheme.' " In the end, the "'clear and convincing evidence,' standard
is not a rigid evidentiary test but a useful reminder to courts that,
where substantial doubt about congressional intent exists, the general
presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is controlling."9 8 And, as the Court's approach in Gressette and Block makes
clear, conclusions about congressional intent may rest on analysis of the
statutory scheme and the purposes that would be served or disserved by
precluding judicial review.
A recent reviewability decision illustrates how unclear is the
Court's sense of how the presumption of reviewability affects the judi9 9 the
cial remedy inquiry. Four years ago in United States v. Fausto,
Court considered whether the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA)
precluded judicial review of claims brought by a certain category of civil
service employees under statutes such as the Tucker Act and the
Backpay Act, each enacted many years before the CSRA. The CSRA
divides employees into three classifications-Senior Executive Service,
Competitive service, and Excepted service. Within each of these categories, there is preferential treatment accorded to veterans and close relatives-what the Act describes as "preference eligibles."' 10 0 The claim at
issue in Fausto was one brought by a nonpreference eligible of the Excepted service. The CSRA was silent regarding judicial review of nonpreference eligible claims. Specifically, it was silent on whether claims
brought by nonpreference eligibles under other statutes, such as the
97.

467 U.S. at 350-51.

98. Id. at 351.
99.
100.

484 U.S. 439 (1988).
5 U.S.C. § 2108 (1988).
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Tucker and Backpay Acts, were precluded. Silence, said the Supreme
Court in Dunlop v. Bachowski,1 1 does not mean that the statute precludes judicial review. Indeed, it does not matter that the silence might
indicate that Congress had not given any thought to whether review is
precluded. The presumption of reviewability places the burden squarely
on Congress to indicate affirmatively, with clear and convincing evidence, that it intends to preclude judicial review in whole or in part.
Despite the Court's straightforward construction of the reviewability presumption in Dunlop, the Court in Fausto followed the approach
of Block by proceeding to examine "the purpose of the CSRA, the entirety of its text, and the structure of review it establishes.' 10 2 In this
light, the Court regarded Congress's failure to provide a scheme of judicial review of nonpreference eligible claims in a statute whose subject
was legal remedies as indicating a clear preference that there should be
no judicial review of such claims. To conclude otherwise, indicated Justice Scalia for the majority, would disrupt the."integrated scheme of
administrative and judicial review, designed to balance the legitimate
interests of the various categories of federal employees with the needs
of sound and efficient administration." 0 3
Justice Stevens's dissent took Congress's silence to indicate something quite different, namely, that Congress intended to leave employees whose remedies were not spelled out in the CSRA with the remedies
they otherwise enjoyed before the enactment of the statute. Hence, by
failing to accord a specific judicial remedy to nonpreference eligibles,
Congress left intact these employees' right to bring suits under any
other applicable statutes. 0 4 The dissent took exception with what it regarded as the Court's mistreatment of the presumption of reviewability.
"It is remarkable," said Justice Stevens in a footnote, "that the majority finds [Congress's intent in the CSRA] sufficiently well expressed in
congressional silence to overcome a presumption that can be rebutted
only by 'clear and convincing evidence' that Congress intended to deny
judicial review. . . . To meet this standard, congressional intent must
05
be fairly discernible in the statutory scheme."'
The methodological disagreement, therefore, turns on the question
of how seriously to take the clear and convincing evidence test of Abbott Laboratories.For the Fausto majority, the presumption of reviewability, at most, organizes the inquiry, framing the issue as one
concerning whether the structure and purposes of the statute would be
101.
102.
102.
104.
105.

421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975).
484 U.S. at.444.
Id. at 445.
See id. at 459-61 (Stevens dissenting).
Id. at 463 n.10 (citing Abbott Laboratories,387 U.S. at 141, and Block, 467 U.S. at 351).
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served or disserved by judicial review. For the dissenters, by contrast,
the presumption of reviewability seems to mean a good deal more.
IV.

CANONS, COURTS, AND CONGRESS

Canonical construction in the form of the presumption of reviewability is one important part of the courts' strategy of expanding their
role in checking agency action in the face of changed political circumstances. But is it a viable and desirable strategy? Is canonical construction the appropriate means by which courts can compete effectively
against manipulation by Congress? And, if the answer is yes, is it possible that there will emerge out of this judicial strategy a series of benefits that will improve the legislative and administrative processes?
The task of the preceding section was to explain the origins of the
presumption of reviewability and to try to describe how courts use the
presumption as an interpretive canon in order to organize the inquiry
into reviewability. It is an inquiry set against the backdrop of the Administrative Procedure Act and the conceptual tensions that animate
contemporary administrative law. In the final Part of this Article, I explore the consequences associated with canons like the presumption of
reviewability and how the enterprise of canonical construction might
facilitate or hinder judicial and legislative processes.
A.

Canonical Construction and Judicial Decisionmaking

Canonical construction can promote judicial economy by reducing
the costs of interpreting statutes. And while we may well regard this
enhanced efficiency as outweighed by other, more critical values undermined by canonical construction, more efficient judicial decisionmaking
is a value worth taking seriously in considering and evaluating this
method of statutory interpretation. Of course, some canons fulfill this
efficiency aim better than others. The presumption of reviewability, for
example, may or may not reduce the costs of judicial decisionmaking.
As explained in the preceding section, there is no easy test for determining what suffices as clear and convincing. Individual judges will conceive of the burden of legislative proof differently. We may require that
Congress express its intent to preclude judicial review through clear
statutory language. The presumption of reviewability thus becomes
equivalent to a clear statement rule. In the alternative, Congress may
have to provide substantial and compelling legislative history that indicates the intent of the legislature to preclude judicial review. The process of statutory interpretation in connection with a preclusion issue
would be ordinary, but the burden of persuasion on the party arguing in
favor of preclusion would be heightened. Finally, the court may hold
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that review is precluded where a party is able to adduce persuasive reasons favoring preclusion. This would broaden the scope of the courts'
preclusion inquiry to include not only statutory language and legislative
history, but also other relevant evidence that indicates that Congress
intended to preclude judicial review. Recent reviewability decisions suggest that the Supreme Court is struggling between the second and third
approaches. 10 6 In any case, the task of construing the statute to determine whether the presumption of reviewability has been adequately rebutted involves significant decisionmaking costs, costs similar in kind to
those incurred by judges in a canonless world. Nonetheless, faithful use
of the reviewability canon will surely limit the discretion of courts to
embark on ungrounded expeditions into the labyrinth of legislative intent in each separate instance of statutory interpretation.
The presumption of reviewability increases judicial decisionmaking
costs for a more obvious reason. Once the court finds that the statute
does not preclude judicial review, it then must proceed to review the
agency decision. By using the presumption, the court is creating more
work for itself. The costs, of course, are not really the costs associated
with finding the agency decision reviewable but, rather, the costs of actually carrying out the review of the agency decision. 10 7 This may involve close study of the agency record or, at least, scrutiny of the
agency's rationale, and a review of extant administrative law doctrine
and other sources of law that shed light on the reasonableness of the
agency's decision. It does not matter how one allocates these costs. The
point is that a court can conserve resources by holding the agency decision unreviewable and thereby avoiding any costs associated with judicial review. The presumption of reviewability stands in the way of this
strategy and therefore has the anomalous effect of streamlining the interpretive process at the price of increasing the courts' overall responsibilities, as well as the overall costs, with regard to judicial review of
agency decisions. Discretion is a double-edged sword.
There is a different sort of discretion that is at work in debates
over the proper role of canonical construction. By developing and applying the canons of construction, courts can recover from the political
branches a certain amount of power over the process of interpretation
106. See text accompanying notes 88-105.
107. To understand the nature and scope of these costs, we need to consider the connection
between reviewability and the courts' attitude toward review. Historically, courts have invoked the
reviewability presumption while they have carried out a strategy of "hard look" review of agency
decisions. Reviewability may, however, be a prelude to judicial deference. If courts are inclined to
find agency decisions reviewable in order to enshrine agency policies by deferring to those decisions, then the increased decisionmaking costs are much less than where the court engages in hard
look review.
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and, as a consequence, preserve their role in implementing and making
regulatory policy. Canonical construction may have the effect of increasing judicial discretion vis-a-vis the legislature by structuring the
interpretive enterprise on the terms and conditions set by judges rather
than by legislatures.
One's normative assessment of this judicial strategy depends in
part on an assessment of the appropriate place of courts in the constitutional and administrative system and on an assessment of how secure
the judicial power is in the contemporary federal order. Like most other
issues involving statutory interpretation, we return to constitutional
separation of powers concerns. What should be the respective roles of
Congress, the courts, and the President in the process of law creation,
implementation, and interpretation?
The judiciary's role in statutory interpretation traditionally has
been understood as limited in two important ways. First and foremost,
legal positivism and constitutional theories of legislative supremacy
have constructed a boundary on judicial creativity in interpreting statutes. 0 8 Statutory interpretation can be a more or less creative enterprise, eclectic in method and directed not simply toward the task of
recovering the legislature's true intent. Interpretation nonetheless is
grounded in a positivistic theory of judicial and legislative responsibilities under a written constitution. 09 The interpretation cognoscenti's
quotation of choice is usually found in The Federalist No. 78: "It can
be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretence of a repugnancy,
may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of
the legislature." 110 Thus, limits on judicial creativity in statutory interpretation flow from these positivistic concerns.
In addition to the will-centered traditions drawn from our constitutional understandings, the legislature may prescribe limits on judicial
creativity. These limits ostensibly may be far removed from the task of
interpretation per se, but nevertheless may bind judicial creativity in
interpreting statutes. Congress may regulate the process of statutory interpretation by instructing courts to interpret statutes in a certain way.
It may direct a court to interpret a statutory provision narrowly or
broadly."' It may instruct the court to interpret certain provisions of
108. See Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 7-12 (Little,
Brown, 1975); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 919,
930 (1989) (reviewing Eskridge and Frickey, Legislation (cited in note 1)).
109. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process,77 Cal. L. Rev. at 929-31 (cited in
note 108).
110. Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 502, 507 (Modern Library, 1941).
111. See Charles A. Shanor, Some Observations on Broadly Construing Civil Rights Laws,
14 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 8 (1991).
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the statute in light of other provisions in that same statute. 112 Moreover, it may direct the courts to look, in interpreting the statute, to
other sources of law, including nonstatutory sources."13 Congress can,
and often does, circumscribe judicial creativity in interpretation by
fiat. 114
Given that Congress has both the power to regulate statutory interpretation and the incentives to do so, I regard canonical construction as
an appropriate means by which courts can preserve an important role
in the process of creating law against potential encroachments and disruptions by the legislature and the executive. The catch, of course, is
that the canons of construction are subject to reversal or revision by
Congress. Canonical construction is an interpretive approach carried
out at the sufferance of the legislature. To the extent that the use of
canons reflects an attempt by the courts to retain prerogatives and to
protect their role in statutory interpretation, it is a strategy implemented in an environment in which the dominant voice in interpretation is still that of Congress, and not the courts. This is as it should be.
It must be within the province of the legislature to create the statutory
framework within which courts carve out their own, special interpretive
role. But the Constitution's system of separation of powers and checks
and balances does a reasonably good job of ensuring that the fight between the legislature and the courts is a fair one. Canonical construction enables courts to establish and enforce public law principles"public values"-that, where properly designed, serve the aims of both
positivism and principled public law.
B.

Canonical Construction and Legislative Decisionmaking

In the paragraph quoted in this Article's introduction, Professor
Cass Sunstein ascribes to canonical construction the rather ambitious
function of "improv[ing] lawmaking processes and the deliberation and
accountability that are supposed to accompany them." 1 5 To be sure,
Professor Sunstein's agenda, however, is not to defend canonical construction per se, but, rather, to defend a distinct set of interpretive
principles fashioned by him and designed primarily to improve regulation." 6 But what of his claim as stated? Does the example of the presumption of reviewability suggest that canonical construction in
112. See Eskridge and Frickey, Legislation (cited in note 1).
113. See, for example, Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (stating that "the privilege
of a witness. . . shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience").
114. See generally Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation (cited in note 31).
115. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution at 154 (cited in note 8).
116. Id.
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general, or this canon in particular, improves the process of lawmaking?
The most critical effect that the presumption of reviewability has
on administrative law and regulation is the reduced incidence of preclusion of review and, hence, the greater incidence of judicial review of
agency decisionmaking. This, alone, has no apparent direct effect on the
process of legislative decisionmaking. Any indirect effects resulting
117
from the phenomenon of judicial scrutiny are difficult to measure.
They are, in any event, difficult to ascribe to the enterprise of canonical
construction as an interpretive method. If the presumption of reviewability has any process effects it must be because it sets in motion a
series of legislative choices that themselves facilitate or hamper intelligent legislative decisionmaking.
The principal consequence of the vigorous enforcement of the reviewability canon is that Congress must produce clear and convincing
evidence that it, a majority of legislators, intended to preclude judicial
review. This burden may be more or less stringent. It may express little
more than an exhortation by Congress to the courts to scrutinize the
structure and purposes of the statute to see whether judicial review
would undermine the legislation. If the presumption means anything,
however, it means that it is harder for Congress to make the case for
preclusion than it would be without the reviewability canon.
The principal danger of the reviewability canon is that it will induce a decisionmaking process that, when completed, may leave
us-including those who want judicial review-worse off than without
the canon. Where Congress must take the appropriate steps to overcome the presumption of reviewability, coalitions that formed to pass a
certain version of the statute may break apart. Thus, the result may not
be a regulatory regime that provides for judicial review but, instead, no
statute. A coalition formed to enact a reviewless statute may collapse in
the face of the requirement that they specifically address preclusion in
the statute's text. Although it is easy to imagine that the only consequence of the presumption of reviewability is to add judicial review to
an otherwise satisfactory statute, another consequence may be the undermining of the bargain struck within the legislature. It is no satisfactory answer to say that we can wait and see whether the statute
unravels after the court's reviewability decision. The fear is that legislators, acting in the shadow of the reviewability canon, will be unable to
accomplish their goal in the first instance. Naturally, these effects are
impossible to measure. What legislation, we would need to ask, failed to
pass because of the presumption of reviewability? And yet the mechan117. Greater agency caution and less chance for agency capture are two examples of potential
indirect effects of judicial scrutiny.
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ics of legislative decisionmaking suggest that canonical construction can
have this result.
In calling upon Congress to provide clear and convincing evidence
to demonstrate that it truly means to preclude judicial review, courts
presume that the failure to come forth with such evidence suggests that
a majority of the legislature intended review. But this does not necessarily follow, as a simple example shows. Consider a hypothetical one
hundred-member legislature faced with a legislative proposal. Assume
that legislators have the following options:
(1) A statute with judicial review
(2) A statute with no judicial review
(3) No statute/status quo
Suppose there are two groups of legislators-A and B-made up of
40 and 20 legislators respectively. While A (40 legislators) prefers alternative (2) to (1), and B (20 legislators) prefers (1) to (2), an AB coalition can form to pass the bill, so long as they agree to leave the
reviewability question unspecified in the statute. Clearly, the fact that
the statute will be interpreted by a court presents a risk to both sides,
the risk that the court will interpret it in a way inconsistent with the
legislators' hopes. But the risk is spread between the two groups and so
long as they are willing to take this risk the bill will pass. While group
C, formed of 40 legislators, votes against the bill, this does not mean
that all or some of the 40 legislators forming this coalition are ambivalent as to whether, if there is to be a statute, there should be judicial
review. Group C's preference ordering may be (3) over (1) and (2), but
(1) over (2). If the AB coalition is cobbled together and its bill is paired
against the status quo, it wins. Does the majority of the legislature intend that the agency's decisions be reviewable? With the presumption
of reviewability, the answer is yes because there is no clear and convincing evidence that the legislature intended to preclude judicial review.
But this judgment may not reflect the true wishes of a majority of legislators. Indeed, it may be that an overwhelming majority of the legislature prefers no review, for example, 49 members of group AB, 40 of
group C or 89 total members may oppose review with 11 members of
AB favoring review."" In effect, the presumption of reviewability invents a legislative coalition. It presumes that a majority of the legislature considered whether to preclude judicial review and declined to do
so. It does not follow, however, that the group of legislators that part
company with the group that wants the statute and wants to preclude
judicial review amounts to a majority of the legislature as a whole.
118. For simplicity's sake, I am assuming that there are no other tradeoffs involved in the
bill. The choice is between these three alternatives only.
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Proponents of the presumption of reviewability may concede that
it does not necessarily guarantee that the legislature's intent will'prevail. What it does guarantee, however, is an increase in the costs the
non-judicial review legislators must bear in order to secure a majority
coalition to effectuate their aims. This increase in transaction costs may
be useful because it forces these legislators to take the necessary steps
to forge a coalition. Whether or not the assumption described above
reflects true legislative preferences, it may be useful simply because it
imposes substantial transaction costs on non-judicial review legislators.
The reviewability presumption raises the costs to legislators who propose to overcome this presumption and to secure unreviewable agency
decisionmaking. 119 This transaction cost strategy makes sense, however,
only if we are willing to accept its consequences. It may be that nonjudicial review legislators' failure to assemble a coalition in favor of
their position may yield a bill that is silent or ambiguous on the subject
of judicial review. Or perhaps, the bill will strike a compromise. As with
the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act at issue in Block,' ° Congress might provide for some types of review but not others. The other
alternative, however, is no statute. Depending upon the preference
functions of the individual legislators, it may be that imposing substantial costs on legislators in order to secure suitable evidence of an intent
to preclude judicial review will wreck the coalition that supports the
bill. The outcome may thus be no bill at all. Ironically, the presumption
of reviewability may, given a set of legislative preferences, be the engine
of the regulation's destruction.
The framers of the Constitution understood that a possible outcome of structuring government to ensure separation of powers and
checks and balances would be stalemate and, accordingly, less policy
overall.' Indeed, some regarded this as a salutary result. Those who
would structure methods of statutory interpretation in order to impose
certain costs on legislators also should understand that a possible outcome is stalemate and inertia. Canonical construction does not simply
119. Professor Jonathan Macey has constructed a theory of statutory interpretation that acts
in a way similar to most forms of canonical construction. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting PublicRegarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L.
Rev. 223 (1986). He suggests that the legislature should be bound by its public-regarding statements in legislation despite the fact that these statements mask the real, private-regarding elements of the statute. Rent-seeking may be the real explanation of statutory language, but
construing statutes in accordance with the legislators' advertised intent allows the court to transform private-regarding legislation into good, public-regarding law. Legislators who insist on constructing a private-regarding deal can do so only by incurring the extra political costs of revealing
this intent on the face of the statute.
120. See text accompanying notes 94-98.
121. See Jonathan Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public
Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 Va. L. Rev. 471 (1988).
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add a gloss to a statute that would exist whether or not the canon exists. The content of the statute, as Professor William Landes and Judge
Richard Posner pointed out a decade and a half ago, 22 is in part a function of the predictions of those who demand this legislation. These predictions which rest on the contemporary legal climate include the
current judicial approach to statutory interpretation. 1 23
Increasing transaction costs could jeopardize regulatory statutes,
but is this consequence likely? Is it reasonable to expect that legislators
would prefer to jettison an otherwise acceptable statute on the grounds
that agency decisions will be subject to judicial review? To answer this
question, consider the two very different institutional arrangements
spawned by a statute that precludes judicial review and one that does
not. The first statute vests the agency with the authority to make regulatory decisions free of judicial control. Of course, the choice is not between agency autonomy and control. Preclusion merely means no
review by the courts. Legislators retain residual power to control agency
decisionmaking. Legislators who contemplate whether to support a statute will take into account whether the proposal contains the appropriate means to control agency decisions. 2 4 If legislators were unable to
secure the appropriate control arrangements in the statute, they may
prefer to surrender altogether. After all, the discounted present value of
the statute may, in the absence of these control arrangements, be negative. For instance, the President may refuse to sign a bill that creates
an administrative agency unless Congress agrees that this agency is located in the executive branch. Congress may refuse to go along, fearing
that such an arrangement would enable the President to control agency
decisionmaking in a way that is costly to Congress. 125
Judicial review is a sort of independent variable in the legislators'
considerations. Legislators can, and do, exercise a certain amount of
control over the process by which courts review agency decisions. These
control efforts are limited, however. Separation of powers ensures that
courts will maintain a residuum of power and prerogatives that Congress cannot touch. Moreover, congressional pressure, even when precisely applied, is unpredictable. Courts are the institutions doing the
122. William Landes and Richard Posner, The Independent Judiciaryin an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J. L. & Econ. 875 (1975).
123. Id.
124. See, for example, McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431 (cited in note 67).
It is not absolutely clear that legislators will construct significant instruments of control in all
instances. There is, after all, a difficult temporal dilemma. Legislators must be careful in structuring control devices ex ante so that they do not give up too much power to future legislators and
legislative coalitions to unravel the bargain struck in this statute.
125. I mean imposing direct costs, not simply faling to provide to legislators suitably generous benefits.
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reviewing and Congress is limited in the ways that it can respond to the
risk of "bad" judicial decisions. 126 Finally, although Congress can influence judges and judicial decisionmaking, as between agencies and
courts, Congress retains a much greater ability to control the former
than it does the latter. Of course, this does not mean that Congress will
always prefer to vest great authority in agencies and to cordon off
agency action from judicial scrutiny. Enhancing agency power may
mean enhancing the power of the President as well as creating a source
of power-the agency itself-that may act in ways counterproductive to
Congressional interests. But, in a given instance, a legislative coalition
may regard the risks of judicial review sufficient as outweighing the
benefits associated with the statute.
Consider, for example, a statute that creates a Consumer Safety
Agency (CSA) and charges it with the responsibility of developing standards for ensuring consumer safety by banning dangerous products,
providing public information, and so forth. The statute is the product
of a coalition formed by legislators who desire greater consumer
safety.' 27 The coalition, however, does not desire this statute at any
price. The legislative majority fashions the CSA as an independent regulatory agency, an agency subject to a myriad of overlapping executive
and legislative controls. In considering whether to preclude judicial review, it knows that courts will scrutinize carefully CSA decisions to
abandon safety standards once they have, in the judgment of CSA, outlived their usefulness. Courts, following the teaching of Motor Vehicle
28
Manufacturers v. State Farm,1
look askance at agency deregulation
that is not supported by substantial reasons. The legislative majority
regards this judicial approach as unacceptable. It cannot take the risk
that the CSA will adopt a standard that cannot be changed except
when the CSA comes forward with persuasive reasons. 129 The coalition
would rather jettison the Consumer Safety Agency altogether than risk
establishing a rigid scheme of regulation, a scheme that has the potential to backfire in legislators' faces.
126. See Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165 (1984).
127. This desire to form a coalition can be for any reason, be it interest group pressure,
constituent response, ideology or anything else. It does not matter for the purposes of this
argument.
128. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
129. Reasons which do not include-unfortunately for legislators-changes in political circumstances. Compare State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist dissenting) (stating that "[a] change
in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for
an executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations") with
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NationalResources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (stating
that "[w]hile agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make policy choices").
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Fashioning a statute that leaves the question of review open may
provide a path out of this morass. The legislators can agree to leave the
reviewability issue open. Both sides-those favoring review, and those
against-bear the risk that the court will construe the statute against
their interests. But, by spreading the risk across these two groups, a
coalition may be able to form.
The presumption of reviewability assigns the risk of unwanted interpretation to one side. Those against review know that unless they
can muster up a majority coalition for this view they will lose, that is,
the courts will find that agency decisions are reviewable. If they prefer
to sacrifice the statute, fearing that courts will cement a CSA decision
to the great detriment of this group of legislators, then the statute does
not pass. Legislators may well find a review statute worse than no statute at all. And this group need not be a majority of the legislature, but
merely a group large enough to destroy the majority coalition that
would otherwise form to pass the statute.
If there is any lesson here it is that judicial strategies of interpretation may have unanticipated consequences. Methods of statutory interpretation may affect legislative choices, and hence outcomes, in
deleterious ways. Affixing procedures to statutes may be especially
problematic, since rational legislators haggle over both procedure and
substance when considering whether to pass legislation. Procedural innovation by courts, therefore, may reconstruct the bargain fashioned by
a legislative coalition.
Acting in the shadow of these canons, legislators may well fail to
make such bargains where there is a substantial risk that the bargain
may be undone. This may be a risk courts are willing to take. After all,
a court concerned with protecting its prerogative to construct an independent administrative law as well as protecting its role in statutory
interpretation against legislative encroachment may well deem the collapse of a legislative coalition a price worth paying. The losers, of
course, are those who would benefit from the existence of this statute,
even without judicial review. Paradoxically, they represent a group of
regulatory beneficiaries that reap most of the benefits from the presumption of reviewability, where it does not disrupt the statutory bargain. But they also bear most of the costs of the presumption where the
presumption does encourage legislative choices that unravel the
bargain.
To consider a final aspect of canonical construction and its consequences for legislative decisionmaking, we must circle back to the two
models of administrative law described earlier. From the courts' standpoint, the measure of whether the presumption of reviewability has succeeded in furthering the aims of interpretation is whether the
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presumption has in fact made it more difficult for Congress to preclude
judicial review. Judges' goals in interpretation, as I have suggested, include not only the instrumental goal of furthering an important public
value, here the value associated with judicial review of agency decisionmaking, but also the goal of protecting judicial prerogatives against legislative threats. Canonical construction may defeat Congress's aims
with respect to reviewability, but it is not so clear that the enterprise of
canonical construction will, or even can, have the long-term effect of
accomplishing the judiciary's larger aims. To be more specific, if Congress is set on furthering a conception of administrative law which embraces the contingent nature of administrative law and the centrality of
political choice and due respect by the courts, then it will wage this war
on a number of different fronts. One of these fronts is reviewability;
but, faced with a presumption of reviewability, Congress may turn
elsewhere.
Congress may structure its substantive statute so that the agency
has more discretion. After all, a court may well retain the power to review agency decisions but, where Congress has accorded great discretion
to the agency, the courts' practical ability to control agency action will
be constricted. Statutes that delegate authority to agencies to regulate
in the public interest provide agencies with generous discretion that is
more difficult for the courts to supervise. Moreover, Congress may reconstruct administrative procedure to insulate agency decisionmaking
from stringent judicial review. If, for instance, requiring the agency to
conduct an on-the-record hearing triggers a "substantial evidence" review under the APA, 130 Congress may be more reluctant to have agencies proceed in this more formal fashion. Congress must decide whether
the value of the extra procedure is worth the risks associated with
stricter judicial review.
Aside from legal controls, Congress may become more vigilant in
controlling administrative agencies through various political means, including congressional oversight and budgetary control. Fearing that a
greater number of decisions will be reviewed by courts, Congress might
take steps to ensure that those judicial decisions are ironclad. It will
also try to limit the agencies' ability to send decisions to reviewing
courts if the consequence of judicial review may be to leave Congress
worse off than if no decision had been reached. The direct result of
these legislative machinations is a different pattern of agency decisions.
Legislators determined to insulate agency decisionmaking from control
while, at the same time, lacking the critical votes to preclude review in
a sufficiently clear and convincing fashion, will act to lessen the effects
130.

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988).
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of judicial review. In doing so, it may leave us with a different decisional pattern or, perhaps, a very different structure of agency
decisionmaking.
The discussion in this section assumes that legislators react to signals from the courts and structure administrative process in response to
these signals. It is, I think, a realistic assumption and one that does not
depend on a pure rational choice conception of legislative behavior. We
must not mistake legislative strategizing in the face of legal rules as a
spirited revenge of the rent-seeking legislators.
Legislative responses to the presumption of reviewability may be
an outgrowth of the legislators' desire to reassert their powers and prerogatives to engage in reelection-maximizing behavior. On the other
hand, a legislature made up of public-regarding individuals may still
resist attempts by the courts to install a methodology of statutory interpretation that swipes the legislature's power to make the complex political choices involved in the regulation and the structure of
administrative decisionmaking. In the hands of a judiciary made up of
judges who set out to exert control over agency decisionmaking in order
to destroy regulation, the presumption of reviewability may be the engine that runs over regulation rather than transporting it past its potential enemies in the legislative and executive branches. In this light,
legislative responses to heightened incidences of judicial review may be
the means of preserving our regulatory tradition.
V.

CONCLUSION

The principal lesson of the presumption of reviewability as a form
of canonical construction is that methods of statutory interpretation
have consequences not only on legislative outcomes but also on judicial
and legislative processes. Some of these consequences are predictable.
Others are more uncertain. In any event, to make the normative case in
favor or against the use of any canon, we should have a better understanding of these consequences. While I have not tried to offer an accounting of the costs and benefits of the presumption of reviewability, I
have suggested some reasons why the canon may serve useful purposes
while at the same time obstructing certain aspects of legislative
decisionmaking.
As an interpretive method, canonical construction fuels judicial
creativity by providing a source of ready-made principles that can be
used as a means of safeguarding judicial prerogatives while at the same
time furthering critical public values. Canonical construction sounds almost too good to be true. Since the alternative is fidelity to the words
and history of the statute regardless of where that method leads, canonical construction commends itself to those skeptical about the tradi-
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tional methods of statutory interpretation and concerned that blind
obedience to the legislative will sacrifices good government at the altar
131
of inchoate notions like supremacy and separation of powers.
But canonical construction is not costless. The use of interpretive
canons as a means of getting around legislative intent or adding to the
otherwise stale words and context of a statute pushes legislators in a
series of directions. Where we can anticipate and assess these legislative
choices triggered by canonical construction, we can evaluate the costs in
light of the benefits. In such instances, we may regard some of the consequences described above as prices well worth paying for the salutary
policy outcomes generated by the canon's use. Some legislative choices,
however, are not easy to predict. For example, it is impossible to describe the statutes not enacted because of the shadow cast by the presumption of reviewability. Moreover, we cannot with confidence ascribe
congressional efforts to recapture administrative law from courts to the
presumption of reviewability of agency action. Nonetheless, we would
do well to appreciate that methods of interpretation have consequences
on legislative decisionmaking and public policy.
In light of these consequences, I think the presumption of reviewability may well cause more problems than it solves. This may or may
not be true of all or most of the other canons of statutory construction.
Close scrutiny of this one particular canon, however, hopefully adds
something to the scholarly literature on statutory interpretation and
the canons. The central question may remain one of legitimacy: do the
courts, in our constitutional system, belong in the business of construing statutes creatively to further important public values? But scholarship directed toward examining the underpinnings of certain canons
and considering how the application of these canons may affect the institutions and structures of public law provides an important source of
information to use in reflecting on this persistent constitutional
question.

131. See Sunstein, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405 (cited in note 2); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 Georgetown L. J. 319 (1989).

